

Potential Fatal Event: Flying Metal – Compressor Coupler



Preliminary Incident Details		
Operation	Bagdad	
Date / Time	March 14, 2023 / 11:14 a.m.	
Туре	Near Miss	
Summary	Employees were troubleshooting a compressor due to surging issues. While testing the motor and compressor, one electrician was watching the protective relay from an adjacent room while another electrician and a mechanic were behind the control panel. When the compressor started and as the motor ramped up, the employees heard a loud clang and found the shaft with broken coupler on the ground nearby.	
Fatal Risk	Uncontrolled Release of Energy	
Risk Category	Actionable	
Pre / Post Rating	Significant (3) Likely (3)	
Absent / Insufficient Controls	 No Standard Operating Procedure in place Failure to use Fatal Risk Management Inadequate Job Risk Assessment 	
Applicable Policies / Procedures	Barricading and Flagging	
Employee Condition	No Injury	
Contact	Chris Svenson, Manager-Health and Safety	

Photos / Links



The coupler's route as it flew out of



- Location where the coupler
 - Location of employees behind control panel
 - Location where shaft landed



Shaft with broken-off coupler



Causal Factors			
 Mechanic was inadequately trained and had no task-specific training. To uncouple compressor, mechanic disconnected the shaft on the compressor but left it connected to the motor side. 			
Action Items	Hierarchy of Controls		
Relocate compressor room control panel to allow start-up from control room. This will eliminate the employee from having to be in the compressor room to start or stop equipment.	CA-1 Elimination/ Engineering		
Explore use of camera-assisted positioning tool to prevent the need for employee to enter the compressor room to observe the equipment while it's running.	CA-2 Substitution/ Engineering		
Create Standard Operating Procedure for this specific process that includes how to start, stop and troubleshoot equipment.	CA-3 Administrative		
Train supervisors and employees on proper motor and compressor troubleshooting protocols. Senior supervisors will conduct a GAP analysis on what training might be necessary for the tasks they are expected to perform.	CA-4 Administrative		

Failed Safeguards / Additional Learnings

- Supervisors will conduct weekly verification of JSAs and make sure FRMs are being reviewed for high-risk tasks before work begins.
- Senior supervisors will conduct monthly review of JSAs and FRM completion.
- Reinforce the use of emergency stop (E-stop) training.

Fatal Risk Management Insufficient Controls

Guards, Barriers and Barricades – INSUFFICIENT

- Are guards, barriers and barricades properly installed to protect personnel from uncontrolled energy release?
- Note about this incident: Guard was removed to troubleshoot equipment. Control panel acted as barrier, but this is not its intended use. No proper control was in place to safeguard employees when troubleshooting motor.

Hose Coupling Lock System – SUFFICIENT

Energy Isolation/LOTOTO – SUFFICIENT

Piping Hoses/Equipment Mechanical Integrity – SUFFICIENT

Relief Valves – SUFFICIENT

Tensioned Lines Management – SUFFICIENT

Pipe Management – SUFFICIENT

Tire Management – SUFFICIENT